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What do network theory and endogenous risk 
theory have to say about the effects of 
central counterparties on systemic stability?
Central counterparties (CCPs) alter the connectivity structure of ﬁ  nancial institutions (FIs), and therefore the 
transmission of shocks. What does network theory have to say about the effects of CCPs on systemic stability, 
and how do different CCP structures (e.g. one vs multiple CCPs) alter systemic risk from a solvability point of 
view? CCPs not only alter the direct interconnection of FIs through their balance sheets, they also affect FIs 
and the links between them indirectly through prices. Prices are endogenous and are not only determined 
by the actions of the FIs, but they in turn constitute imperatives for FIs to act through marking-to-market and 
risk-sensitive constraints, both natural ingredients of CCPs. Could such feedback effects from CCPs amplify 
market movements and ﬁ  nancial stress?
JEAN-PIERRE ZIGRAND
London School of Economics
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O
ne can imagine a wide array of reasons why 
in principle a move from OTC derivatives 
trades to central counterparties (CCPs) 
would have social beneﬁ  ts. For instance regulators 
would beneﬁ  t from informational advantages due 
to one of the roles CCPs can play, namely the role 
of a data repository easily accessible by regulators. 
CCPs also can help in reducing counterparty risk 
through the combination of their own capital in 
the pooled guarantee fund as well as the initial and 
the variation margin posted by counterparties and 
the regular settlement features of proﬁ  t and loss. 
However, little academic work has been done on this 
subject, and some research papers make the point 
that CCPs might not necessarily have social beneﬁ  ts 
only. For instance, Dufﬁ  e and Zhu (2009) have 
shown that multiple specialised CCPs might lead 
to inefﬁ  cient use of collateral. Some commentators 
have also mentioned the fact that systemic risk 
gets concentrated in CCPs, that the failure of a CCP 
would be truly catastrophic, and that if CCPs were 
linked in a network, there may be a domino effect 
of failures. On top of such balance sheet effects, 
the current crisis has highlighted the damage that 
self-fulﬁ  lling feedback effects through asset prices 
can have on the ﬁ  nancial system, even in the 
absence of any bankruptcies. Would CCPs have 
reduced or inﬂ  ated such externalities?
The aim in this short note is to think through costs 
and beneﬁ  ts, and to forewarn regulators and market 
participants of possible side effects of different 
CCP structures. Due to the lack of fully worked-out 
research papers on the subject of CCPs, we use this 
opportunity to imagine what the likely outcomes 
might be once CCPs have been integrated into 
a rigorous modelling of the ﬁ  nancial system. This 
endeavour must be speculative by nature, but the 
hope is that the ideas might make policy makers aware 
of some of the possible unintended consequences of 
CCPs, both beneﬁ  cial and detrimental.
We shall try to focus on those two effects that we 
believe will be crucial in determining whether 
CCPs will be able to live up to the high hopes for 
systemic stability that they have been endowed 
with: endogenous risk and interlinkages.
1| ENDOGENOUS RISK
The ﬁ  rst effect CCPs will have on the ﬁ  nancial 
system is that they have the potential to affect 
price dynamics in the ﬁ  nancial markets. Securities 
prices are not simply net present values of future 
payments as they would be in a frictionless risk 
neutral world. Securities prices are determined by 
demand and supply considerations that themselves 
discount such future payments in a possibly 
risk-averse manner, but demand and supply are also 
subjected to many further effects, some of them 
institutional. The net outcome is that prices are 
subjected to fundamental payoff-related risk (prices 
embed fundamental security-related information 
and are ﬂ  uctuating randomly to reﬂ  ect innovations 
in such fundamental information) and to what has 
become known as endogenous risk,1 which is the risk 
impounded into securities prices by the structure of 
the ﬁ  nancial system. Overall risk is the sum of those 
two components, and given the feedback effects and 
ampliﬁ  cation mechanisms at work in the markets 
through the endogenous risk channel, overall risk 
can be many times higher than fundamental risk. 
This is obvious to ﬁ  nancial practitioners, and should 
be obvious to those who have lived through the 
current crisis. 
A simple analogue might be helpful at this stage. 
The Millennium Bridge built in London to celebrate 
the new millennium suffered from exactly such 
endogenous and destabilising feedback effects. 
A small gust of wind (the fundamental shock) 
could set the Millennium bridge to sway a tiny bit. 
Pedestrians crossing the bridge slightly adjusted 
their stance as a response, pushing the bridge further 
in the same direction. Provided sufﬁ  ciently many 
pedestrians found themselves in the same situation, 
they felt compelled to coordinate and lockstep, and 
they thereby reinforced the swaying into a rather 
wild wobble. The resulting swaying was many times 
more forceful than the fundamental one, which was 
a tiny initial gust of wind.
Similarly, as ﬁ   nancial conditions worsen, the 
willingness of market participants to bear risk 
1  See the introduction paper by Danielsson and Shin (2003) or the formal models in Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2010) and in Danielsson and Zigrand (2008).
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seemingly evaporates even in the absence of any 
further hard negative news, which in turn worsens 
ﬁ  nancial conditions, closing the loop. It appears 
to an outside observer that the “risk appetite” of 
a large part of the market participants disappears 
at the same time.2 Such death spirals occur due 
to the coordinating effects of similar risk systems 
(e.g. Basel II inspired value-at-risk—VaR rules), 
of regular settlement and marking-to-market 
leading to regular margin calls.3 They also appear 
if delta hedgers are net short gamma or engaged 
in similar programme trades (the crash of 1987 or 
the “ﬂ  ash crash”' of May 6th 2010 come to mind).4 If 
one ﬁ  nancial institution (FI) needs to sell a security 
due to a pickup in volatility, its sale depresses 
prices. Other ﬁ  nancial institutions will need to mark 
their positions down, will need to honour margin 
calls, and have their own risk systems prompting 
a reduction of risk because of the joint effect of higher 
volatility and lower capital. This in turn reinforces 
the downturn, and the loop closes.5 The effects 
are identical to the reinforcing locked steps on the 
Millennium Bridge. The prudent and conservative 
actions that any one individual institution takes 
to enhance its soundness may undermine the 
soundness of others. This fundamentally important 
insight, which can be dubbed “the fallacy of 
composition,” forces regulators to rethink regulations 
since for the system to be safe, it is not sufﬁ  cient 
for each institution to be safe. To the contrary, 
making any one institution safe may weaken the 
overall system depending on the precise nature 
of the regulations that were meant to make each 
institution safe. It is tempting to design regulations 
whose ﬁ  rst order effects are common sensical and 
go in the right direction, but unfortunately one 
cannot understand the mechanisms underlying 
ﬁ  nancial crises without keeping this simple point 
in mind: in precisely the precarious situations for 
which the rules have been designed, the unintended 
nonlinear second order effects dominate the ﬁ  rst 
order linear ones.6 Some of the regulatory responses 
to the crisis were more reminiscent of attempts to 
outlawing the gust of wind or of closing the bridge 
(and leaving pedestrians stranded) than to ﬁ  nding 
ways to prevent pedestrians from lockstepping.
While there probably are no reliable data on the 
precise extent to which ﬁ  nancial institutions have 
hitherto regularly marked-to-market OTC exposures, 
called for collateral and managed margins and 
haircuts in response to market developments, it 
would appear that many institutions have managed 
such exposures to some extent as would a CCP have 
done. While not exactly comparable, daily collateral 
exchanges play the role of daily margin calls, and 
up-front collateral (known as the “independent 
amount”) plays the role of the initial margin. Still, 
there is little doubt that a sufﬁ  ciently large part of the 
OTC exposures have not been dealt with in this way, 
and some well known cases of under collateralised 
exposures are known.7 8 My guess is that for an 
otherwise identical amount of derivatives trade, 
CCPs will increase aggregate marking-to-market 
and regular margin calls, potentially reinforcing 
the existing feedback spirals. CCPs being central 
and systemically important, they will have no 
choice but to religiously insist on margining. They 
cannot temporarily suspend marking-to-market and 
regular settlement, unless governments come in 
with guarantees or central banks offer back-stops. 
Also, it would appear that over collateralisation of 
2  It appears that asset returns are driven by a latent risk appetite factor. This factor is relevant to central banks that compute this factor in the normal course of 
events, see for instance ECB (2007) and the methodology devised by Gai and Vause (2005). Indeed, risk tolerance and ﬁ  nancial crises are inseparable, see for instance 
Coudert and Gex (2008) for an empirical analysis. In Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand this risk appetite factor is endogenised and is driven by the capitalisation level 
of the ﬁ  nancial sector.
3  A bank must of course mark-to-market its books for risk management purposes. The insidious effects of marking-to-market arise when through marking-to-market 
FIs are forced to mechanically adjust their positions.
4  For instance, Gennotte and Leland (1990) make this point. But endogenous risk is more general because the “strike price” beyond which feedback effects pick up 
is made endogenous. The ampliﬁ  cations from delta hedging of put options only occur where gamma is highest, which is around the strike, but the strikes of the 
portfolio protection strategies are by themselves a choice variable.
5  Contagion does not have to be limited to risky securities: with Government bailouts contagion can feed through to sovereigns, as correctly predicted by Jassaud 
(2009).
6  This point has been made also in Danielsson et al (2001) on the equilibrium effects of Basel II. 
7  While no objective data sources seem to exist, it would appear (also see Singh, 2010) that many privileged entities (such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, AAA insurers 
such as Berkshire Hathaway and AIG, or institutions such as European Bank for Reconstruction and Development –EBRD) have not posted upfront collateral. 
Also, dealer to dealer banks do not usually post collateral between each other in light of the many offsetting trades, at least not until such point as too large an 
imbalance builds up. Exposures to sovereigns and corporates also tend to be under collateralised. ISDA for instance states that 70% of OTC derivatives trades are 
collateralised, though it is not clear whether those 70% are fully collateralised, nor is it clear what fraction of OTC derivatives value is collateralised. For instance, 
based on a recent survey (ECB, 2009), it would appear that EU bank exposures may be collateralised well below this. Singh (2010) estimates that the degree of under 
collateralisation is about USD 2 trillion for residual derivative payables.
8  Notice also that hedge funds will not make much of a difference to margining given that they already post both up-front and daily collateral, and that their exposures 
are generally over collateralised. The regulatory scrutiny of hedge funds seems to be motivated by factors other than systemic stability.
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the independent amount reduces the need for daily 
margin calls in the OTC world, making a move to 
CCPs more pro-cyclical still.9 This effect needs to 
be contrasted then to the volume of derivatives that 
is likely to be traded after CCPs become mandatory 
for the eligible contracts. There might be more trade 
(say since counterparty risk is lessened, or since 
markets become more transparent and potentially 
more competitive, not least due to reduced 
post-trade costs) or there might be less (say since 
trading derivatives may become more onerous and 
capital intensive, not least due to marking-to-market). 
While the net effect is not known at this stage, 
it would be fair to presume that both volumes and 
feedbacks will increase.
Now imagine an economy with more than one CCP 
and contrast it to the otherwise identical economy 
with only one CCP. Imagine FI number 1 trading 
with FI number 2. Imagine also that the FIs have 
two exposures that pretty much net out. This is 
a very frequent situation. If both are cleared by 
the same CCP, then a deterioration in the markets 
leads to no margin calls, and the endogenous 
risk channel will not be materially magniﬁ  ed by 
those two exposures. But if both are cleared on 
two separate CCPs with no links between the two, 
an increase in volatility will lead, regardless of 
the direction of the markets, to margin calls and 
a selling of risk.10 Since capital is difﬁ  cult to come 
by instantaneously, the prudent action of any one of 
the two institutions involved is to reduce its overall 
risk, probably partly by selling risky securities, 
and probably by selling those risky securities 
that can be sold. It follows that chances are that 
effective risk aversion will have been increased 
in the markets and that asset prices fall, increasing 
correlations as a result, since other FIs not involved 
with 1 and 2 will also need to adjust their risk. 
Those effects in turn will lead to the closing of the 
feedback loop through higher risk measures and 
lower capital. Evidently, this example is overly 
simpliﬁ  ed (FIs will attempt to clear the trades on 
the same CCP), but it does provide another angle, 
the endogenous risk angle, to the question as to 
whether the number of CCPs matters. People have 
argued that multiple CCPs may lead to inefﬁ  cient 
use of collateral, see for instance the recent paper 
by Dufﬁ  e and Zhu (2010), but we would add that 
a further worry is that multiple poorly coordinated 
CCPs will not only require more collateral, they 
will make the collateral – and markets – potentially 
less safe from a  macro-prudential point of view by 
increasing the negative externalities. 
Cross-margining would mitigate this worry of an 
increase in endogenous risk. For instance, not 
only does the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) 
act as a clearing house for the majority of options 
products traded on the majority of US exchanges, 
yielding netting beneﬁ  ts that reduce feedback loops, 
the OCC, ICE Clear US and the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) have also operated cross-margin 
programmes for a number of eligible products for 
many years.11 Initial margin is reduced as a result and 
net settlements are smaller. This would be the way 
to reduce feedback effects from margining. Another 
hub structure that is of a link arrangement type has 
been established in Europe (see Kalogeropoulos et 
al. (2007) for the details) between OMX Derivatives 
Markets (acting as the hub), LCH.Clearnet and 
VPS clearing ASA. Again, contractual arrangements 
have been established without a CCP being a member 
of the other CCPs. Maintenance margin calls across 
CCPs are ﬁ  nanced in the form of cash or an increase 
in a bank guarantee.12 13 While cross-margining 
9  Pro-cyclicality could also become temporarily higher if FIs move from under collateralised OTC to more fully collateralised CCPs due to the fact that collateral is 
typically cash or highly rated sovereigns. If FIs have trouble ﬁ  nding this collateral, they might then be tempted to sell out of riskier securities, raising risk aversion 
in the markets.
10  The same effect will appear if one exposure goes to a CCP while the other one remains bilaterally cleared.
11  In a nutshell, a joint (across CCPs) clearing account for each member is established. The OCC acts as a sort of netting agent and central hub CCP of CCPs and 
maintains the account, computes the relevant margins and then distributes position, margin and settlement reports to clearing members.
12  In a systemic downturn, it is likely that the values of the bank guarantees themselves drop pro-cyclically, making bank guarantees perhaps not the ideal instrument 
for links on a larger scale.
13  Contrast this to the ongoing debate in the European cash equity markets where LCH.Clearnet, EMCF, X-clear, Euro CCP etc. have been in the process of trying to 
forge “interoperability” links with each other, whereby a trader has the choice where a trade executed on a given trading venue is sent for clearing. The trader can 
then send all trades for clearing to the same CCP, generating an off-set of margin. Since the two counterparties to the trade may send the trade to different CCPs, 
cross-CCP positions arise (since one CCP now becomes a counterparty to the other one in lieu of the original counterparty) that need to be dealt with. In particular, 
interoperability is feared to introduce potentially systemic exposures across CCPs that a form of inter-CCP margining must address. We return to this point. The 
same interoperability may be established across derivatives CCPs, where CCPs and interoperability take on a role of a larger order of magnitude yet compared to 
cash equity. The difﬁ  culties in getting European cash equity CCPs and regulators to agree on an interoperability model in cash equities may be due to the fact that 
counterparty risk mitigation is relatively small in cash equities, and that it would seem rather more likely that such an agreement can be struck in the complex 
market of derivatives clearing where counterparty risk mitigation is crucial.
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unambiguously reduces endogenous risk, we would 
expect cross-participation and link arrangements to 
do so as well, although the argument would to some 
extent depend on the type and liquidity of the assets 
held by the CCP that is a member of another CCP.
There is a related point having to do with the 
feedback effects caused by marking-to-market and 
the push towards exchange-based trading. There is 
no obvious solution to the fact that many securities 
are illiquid, which makes it hard to ﬁ  nd the true 
value for mark-to-marking. The marks will appear 
to be the “ofﬁ  cially correct audited market prices” 
and it might well be those marks that all FIs will 
have to use for marking their books to, even if the 
superior valuation capacities of a given FI imply that 
the FI knows the mark to be dangerously off.14 To 
summarise, if illiquid and immature OTC products 
are forced onto CCPs, not only may the CCP be 
poorly equipped to manage the risk imbedded in 
these products and run the risk of failing,15 the 
negative feedback externalities arising from the 
fact that the price set by the CCP will constitute 
an imperative for all counterparties to adjust their 
own marks, increase systemic risk. The crisis shows 
clearly that liquidity can dry up very quickly, and 
that the resulting impossibility to smoothly mark all 
positions to market was a contributor to the extent 
of the crisis. In that sense the fallacy of composition 
appears in a different context: it is not true that if all 
products are cleared, and therefore appear to be safe, 
that the system overall is safe. Indeed, it probably 
is safer to only require clearing of products that are 
mature and well understood.
Finally, endogenous risk and pro-cyclicalities may 
arise depending on the way the guarantee fund 
is replenished. If the guarantee fund is replenished 
through risk-sensitive rules, such as VaR, the CCP 
will ask for capital in periods of turmoil and will 
return capital in quiet times, everything else equal.16 
Uncertain times are usually times where capital of FI 
comes under pressure. Calls to stock up the capital at 
the CCP will therefore likely be met in the short run 
through sales of risky assets and through increases 
in haircuts from borrowers (such as through repos), 
reinforcing the pro-cyclicality of markets. 
2| INTERCONNECTEDNESS
Network theory is a relatively young branch of 
research in ﬁ  nance. Most network papers applied 
at regulatory or central bank level are of the 
pure domino type. The interlinkages are balance 
sheet interlinkages, and the insolvency of one 
bank can lead to the insolvency of another bank 
that is exposed to the ﬁ  rst bank, and so on. A fair 
conclusion would be that these domino network 
models have led to the conclusion that the potential 
for a systemic breakdown is very small in that only 
implausibly large shocks fed into the simulations 
lead to meaningful contagion.17 This is partly 
due to the fact they are missing the endogenous 
risk component of contagion which can amplify 
downturns dramatically.
Let us ﬁ  rst consider a domino type economy with 
no CCP. The FIs have established balance sheet links 
between each other, and these links are common 
knowledge.18 Which network is more robust to 
balance sheet shocks, a dense complete network, 
a largely disconnected sparsely linked one, or 
something in between? 
We can use the recent model by Cabrales, Gottardi 
and Vega Redondo (2010) as a guide. The authors 
assume that the links across banks are not interbank 
deposits but securitisations of bank assets. Banks 
14  CCPs have established procedures to try to mitigate this risk through consensus based ofﬁ  cial end-of-day settlement prices determined on the basis of market prices, 
prices submitted by member ﬁ  rms and/or theoretical model prices, and then adjusted to represent executable market prices. For instance, in 2009, ICE Clear Europe 
adopted procedures requiring clearing members to randomly implement trades at prices generated by their indicative settlement prices. Little academic research 
seems to have been done on the accuracy of this settlement price, and little information is publicly available as to the frequency and notional value of such forced 
trades, if any. Eurex says it implements an additional liquidity margin. 
15  In order to actually fulﬁ  ll its role to reduce counterparty risk, the CCP needs to ﬁ  gure out the right margins and the likely number of days it takes to unwind any 
trade that the CCP may inherit from defaulting members, as well as the required size of the guarantee fund.
16  Unfortunately, none of the CCPs seem to publish the details of their VaR and stress-testing rules governing the additional contributions to their guarantee funds. 
Leaving market participants in doubt as to the effects on systemic stability of those institutions that are supposed to provide the markets with systemic stability in 
the ﬁ  rst place is unlikely to be reassuring.
17  For an interesting paper in this spirit with random connections, but with CDS contracts, see Cont and Minca (2009), who compute their systemic risk measure 
without a CCP and with one CCP.
18  We return to the question of network formation. Here, as in the vast majority of ﬁ  nancial network papers, the network is considered as given. The assumption that 
the network is common knowledge is a very strong one to which we return.
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securitise their assets and acquire a fraction of some 
of the other banks' assets. Banks can be hit with 
shocks whereby some of the assets turn bad. There 
are frequent small to medium size shocks to banks as 
well as the potential of a rare but large shock affecting 
one of the banks. The large shock is modeled using 
distributions that may exhibit fat tails. There is no 
lender or market maker of last resort. All of the 
structure is common knowledge. In contrast to Allen 
and Gale (2000), in this setup the authors ﬁ  nd that 
when indeed the distribution of the shocks exhibits 
fat tails, an intermediate level of connectivity is 
on average most able to resist the propagation of 
shocks. In a sparsely connected network, even small 
shocks will ruin the affected connected banks due 
to insufﬁ  cient securitisation, while in the fully 
connected network the bad shock is able to bring 
down the entire system (but the small shocks can 
be mutualised). In an intermediate system the 
small shocks can again be diversiﬁ  ed, while the bad 
shock only brings down part of the system due to 
the fact that not all banks are exposed to the shock, 
directly or indirectly. In a nutshell, the mixture of 
the distributions of the small, intermediate and large 
shocks determine the optimal network structure. 
Now let us imagine that one central node (playing 
the role of a non-specialised CCP) is introduced. 
It would then appear that each FI sells part of its 
overall balance sheet to the central node through 
securitisation. In effect, each FI then swaps part 
of its balance sheet with the aggregate balance 
sheet of all FIs linked to the CCP.19 With a single 
CCP, the effects should be similar to the ones in 
the completely connected network. With two or 
more CCPs that are not directly linked, and that are 
only weakly indirectly linked, the network would 
presumably be more ﬂ  exible than the one with one 
CCP only if the big one is drawn from a fat tailed 
distribution. If the multiple CCPs are fully linked in 
the sense of swapping the securitised balance sheets 
of its members, the big one would bring the entire 
system down.
Three comments are in order.
First, most ﬁ   nancial network models consider 
a network as a given or as randomly generated. They 
do not model the formation of the network. In Rahi 
and Zigrand the (static) network is determined in 
a network formation game whereby FIs establish 
links at a Nash equilibrium, each FI taking into 
account the links formed by all other FIs. It is 
shown there that network formation is subjected to 
a prisoners' dilemma and the equilibrium network 
is always inefﬁ  cient. The network maximising FI 
value is a hub and spoke network with one particular 
central hub. This central hub plays the role of 
a CCP since all trades must pass through it and 
are fully collateralised. Although market liquidity 
is maximised, due to the prisoners' dilemma 
feature, this central hub must be imposed 
through regulations. 
Second, and unfortunately, if there are multiple 
CCPs, the current theoretical models are unable 
at this stage to determine the exact form of 
interoperability of those multiple CCPs, whether the 
CCPs network is complete and either (i) making each 
CCP a member of each other CCP and contribute 
initial and variational margin or (ii) asking CCPs to 
set extra capital aside as a buffer against other CCPs 
failing without imposing any margins,20 or whether 
indeed the CCPs should be set up in a hub and spoke 
network with the cross-margining undertaken by the 
hub as a netting agent, or any other form of linkage. 
Third, the network structure in all of the network 
models we are aware of is common knowledge. 
We cannot point to any academic papers that 
have fully analysed the damaging effects of 
informational intransparency (such as the extent of 
under-collateralised OTC derivatives exposure of 
any one FI in the network with any other FI, or 
the ﬁ  ne print in the bilateral agreements among 
different CCPs that currently are conﬁ  dential 
commercial contracts) on the magniﬁ  cation  of 
19  This is shown to be both the optimal and the equilibrium asset structure in a security design game where the securities are not all given but can be innovated by 
the FIs, see Rahi and Zigrand (2008).
20  This approach, broadly proposed by EuroCCP for cash equities, might reduce liquidity and endogenous risk up to a point.
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the transmission of shocks in networks. The idea 
would be one of uncertainty versus risk. While 
the FI is not overly bothered with transparency 
when the party is in full swing and risk appears 
low, in a crisis however risk aversion increases and 
behaviour changes. If in a crisis a FI does not know 
the connectedness of counterparties and the extent 
to which those exposures are fully collateralised, 
perhaps the FI rationally acts according to a robust 
control methodology, maximising its own objective 
function while preparing for – and expecting – 
the worst. This way of behaving has been put 
forward as a way to understand the freezing of the 
interbank and repo markets and the large holdings 
of cash by banks, which in turn made the downturn 
more brutal.
We can now merge the two themes of endogenous risk and of interconnections. On one hand 
we conjectured that a ﬁ   nancial system with one or with multiple but fully linked CCPs (linked in 
the securitisation sense) may be less able to withstand the big one (if the big one hits only one of the FIs). 
It must be emphasised that this experiment was a static domino experiment and that market prices played 
no role. On the other hand, with market prices subjected to endogenous risk, multiple unlinked CCPs 
exacerbate the downward spirals that spread and worsen ﬁ  nancial crises since prices coordinate the 
actions of all players, whether directly linked or not. Furthermore, if intransparency of the ﬁ  nancial network 
reduces risk appetite in times of crisis, multiple unlinked CCPs further amplify the crisis dynamics. 
As often, there are two opposing effects. The net effect would depend on the trade-off between the 
magnitude of the initial exogenous shock and the strength of the feedback effects. Perhaps when 
reviewing the current crisis that emanated from the subprime segment, it would appear to this author that 
the latter have dominated the former in that the crisis seemed to have been made much more ferocious 
by the workings of the ﬁ  nancial system itself, compared to what the initial subprime shock would have 
suggested, and that while Lehman's default did play a large role, the dominos created perhaps less 
contagion than the market price dynamics did.
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